The Internet of Things (IoT) revolution has also impacted Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), and due to which, the WSNs are being increasingly coupled with IP network. The security issues which are prevalent in the IP network have to be addressed by these IoT based WSNs. Recently, in the literature, encryption of data packets through 3 Data Encryption Standard (3DES) technique was presented to cater data packet encryption requirements in IoT based WSNs. However, this encryption technique is impractical for WSNs because the sensor nodes operate with limited energy reserves, and 3DES technique is computationally expensive technique. The main open issue is to perform 3DES data packet encryption by incurring limited energy expenditure. To address this open issue, in this paper, a new 3DES data packet encryption scheme denoted as Neighbor Node Cooperation (NNC) scheme is presented. In the NNC scheme, the encryption load of the source node is distributed among its neighbor nodes. Selection of the most suitable neighbor nodes for the NNC scheme is modeled as an optimization problem, which is shown to have non-polynomial complexity. Hence, this optimization problem is approximately solved using randomized algorithm. The formal performance bounds of the randomized algorithm are outlined. The proposed encryption scheme is simulated and compared against the contemporary technique presented in the literature. In the outlined simulation study, the proposed encryption technique significantly outperforms the contemporary technique WRT incurred energy expenditure for data packet encryption.

WSN, 3DES, Encryption, IoT

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