

## An Efficient Method to Discover Transformed Data Leak

S. Sindhuja<sup>1\*</sup>, M. Valliammai<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>M.Sc Computer Science, Idhaya College for Women, Kumbakonam, Tamilnadu, India

<sup>2</sup>M.Sc Computer Science, Idhaya College for Women, Kumbakonam, Tamilnadu, India

Corresponding Author: [sindhu890@gmail.com](mailto:sindhu890@gmail.com)

Available online at: [www.ijcseonline.org](http://www.ijcseonline.org)

**Abstract**—The computer system poses a serious threat to the organisational security due to the leak of sensitive data. According to the report of risk based security (RBS), the leaked sensitive data records has increased dramatically during last few years, (i.e.) from 412 million in 2012 to 822 million in 2013. These are caused only by the lack of proper encryption on files and documents and by human errors these causes data loss. Organisation has the responsibility of screening the content which is stored in the system as sensitive data. In this paper, we utilize two techniques, which are levenshtein-distance technique and lucene search framework. These two helps to detect the leakage of data and this technique is used for screening the data which are outsourced and it also keep an track of, who is transferring the data.

**Keywords**—Sensitive data, Data leak, Data detection, levenshtein-distance, lucene search.

### I. INTRODUCTION

In Networks data leak detection, content inspection, sampling, alignment, dynamic programming parallelism is performed. A report show that the number of leaked sensitive data records has grown 10 times in the last 4 years, and it reached a record high of 1.1 billion in 2014. A significant portion of the data leak incidents are due to human errors, for example, a lost or stolen laptop containing unencrypted sensitive files, or transmitting sensitive data without using end-to-end encryption. A recent Kaspersky Lab survey shows that accidental leak by staff is the leading cause for internal data leaks in corporates. The data-leak risks posed by accidents exceed the risks posed by vulnerable software. In order to minimize the exposure of sensitive data and documents, an organization needs to prevent clear text sensitive data from appearing in the storage or communication.

A screening tool can be deployed to scan computer file systems, server storage, and inspect outbound network traffic. The tool searches for the occurrences of plaintext sensitive data in the content of files or network traffic. It alerts users and administrators of the identified data exposure vulnerabilities. For example, an organization's mail server can inspect the content of outbound email messages searching for sensitive data appearing in unencrypted messages. Data leak detection differs from the anti-virus (AV) scanning (e.g., scanning file systems for malware signatures) or the network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) (e.g., scanning traffic payload for malicious

patterns). AV and NIDS typically employ automated based string matching (e.g., Aho-Corasick, Boyer-Moore, which match static or regular patterns).

### II. RELATED WORK

In [1], X Shu, D Yao, E Bertin- “Privacy preserving detection of sensitive data exposure”, Statistics from security firms, research institutions and government organizations show that the number of data-leak instances has grown rapidly in recent years. Among various data-leak cases, human mistakes are one of the main causes of data loss. There exist solutions detecting inadvertent sensitive data leaks caused by human mistakes and to provide alerts for organizations. A common approach is to screen content in storage and transmission for exposed sensitive information. Such an approach usually requires the detection operation to be conducted in secrecy. This secrecy requirement is challenging to satisfy in practice, as detection servers may be compromised or outsourced. In this paper, we present a privacy-preserving data-leak detection (DLD) solution to solve the issue where a special set of sensitive data digests is used in detection. The advantage of our method is that it enables the data owner to safely delegate the detection operation to a semi honest provider without revealing the sensitive data to the provider. We describe how Internet service providers can offer their customers DLD as an add-on service with strong privacy guarantees.

In [2], Xiaokui Shu, Jing Zhang, Danfeng (Daphne) Yao, Wu-Chun Feng- “Rapid Screening of Kevin Border,

**Inc, Ann Arbor-“ Quantifying Information Leaks in Outbound Web Traffic”**, As the Internet grows and network bandwidth continues to increase, administrators are faced with the task of keeping confidential information from leaving their networks. Today’s network traffic is so voluminous that manual inspection would be unreasonably expensive. In response, researchers have created data loss prevention systems that check outgoing traffic for known confidential information. These systems stop naïve adversaries from leaking data, but are fundamentally unable to identify encrypted or obfuscated information leaks. What remains is a high-capacity pipe for tunnelling data to the Internet. We take advantage of the insight that most network traffic is repeated or determined by external information, such as protocol specifications or messages sent by a server. By filtering this data, we can isolate and quantify true information flowing from a computer. In this paper, we present measurement algorithms for the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), the main protocol for web browsing. When applied to real web browsing traffic, the algorithms were able to discount 98.5% of measured bytes and effectively isolate information leaks.

In [3], **Somesh Jha- “Towards Practical Privacy for Genomic Computation”**, Many basic tasks in computational biology involve operations on individual DNA and protein sequences.

These sequences, even when anonymized, are vulnerable to re-identification attacks and may reveal highly sensitive information about individuals. We present a relatively efficient, privacy-preserving implementation of fundamental genomic computations such as calculating the edit distance and Smith-Waterman similarity scores between two sequences. Our techniques are cryptographically secure and significantly more practical than previous solutions. We evaluate our prototype implementation on sequences from the database of protein families, and demonstrate that its performance is adequate for solving real world sequence-alignment and related problems in a privacy preserving manner. Furthermore, our techniques have applications beyond computational biology. They can be used to obtain efficient, privacy-preserving implementations for many dynamic programming algorithms over distributed datasets.

In [4], **Sailesh Kumar, Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran, Jonathan Turner “Curing Regular Expressions Matching Algorithms from Insomnia, Amnesia, and Acalculia”**, The importance of network security has grown tremendously and a collection of devices have been introduced, which can improve the security of a network. Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are among the most widely deployed such system; popular NIDS use a collection of signatures of known security threats and viruses, which are used to scan each packet’s payload. Today, signatures are often specified as regular expressions; thus the core of the

NIDS comprises of a regular expressions parser; such parsers are traditionally implemented as finite automata. Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) are fast, therefore they are often desirable at high network link rates. DFA for the signatures, which are used in the current security devices, however require prohibitive amounts of memory, which limits their practical use. In this paper, we argue that the traditional DFA based NIDS has three main limitations: first they fail to exploit the fact that normal data streams rarely match any virus signature; second, DFAs are extremely inefficient in following multiple partially matching signatures and explodes in size, and third, finite automata are incapable of efficiently keeping track of counts. We propose mechanisms to solve each of these drawbacks and demonstrate that our solutions can implement a NIDS much more securely and economically, and at the same time substantially improve the packet throughput.

#### **Disadvantages of existing system**

- Inadvertent data leak.
- Malicious data leak.
- Data traffic and time consuming.
- Static filtering of authorized users.

### **III. METHODOLOGY**

In our proposed system we propose a data-leak detection solution which can be outsourced from organization, we design and implement Lucerne search engine framework Levenshtein-distance technique to avoid data leak and also provide privacy preserving to Sensitive data. Two most important players in our proposed model is

- **Data Owner** owns the Sensitive data and authorizes the DLD provider to inspect the network traffic from the organizational networks for anomalies, namely inadvertent data leak.
- **Mail Server - DLD provider** inspects the network traffic for potential data leaks.

We focus on detecting inadvertent data leaks, and we assume the content in filesystem or network traffic is available to the inspection system. A supervised network channel could be an unencrypted channel or an encrypted channel where the content in it can be extracted and checked by an authority. Authority has the threshold for every categorized position of users.

- In our security model, we assume that the analysis system is secure and trustworthy. Privacy-preserved data-leak detection can be achieved by leveraging special protocols and computation steps. It is another functionality of a detection system.
- We implement the web service to maintain the users and Sensitive content instead of data bases because of static implementation and rough data handling. Even the Sensitive data storage have to be preserved from threats in existing

system. For that purpose we used to maintain the Sensitive data in cloud.

#### Advantages of proposed system

- The implemented Levenshtein distance technique and Lucene search framework are used to avoid data leak.
- The DLD provider inspects the network for data leaks in the mail server.
- Threshold is given to all employees.
- Network traffic is reduced.

[4] S. Kumar, B. Chandrasekaran, J. Turner, and G. Varghese, "Curing regular expressions matching algorithms from insomnia, amnesia, and acalculia," in *Proc. 3rd ACM/IEEE Symp. Archit. Netw. Commun. Syst. (ANCS)*, 2007, pp. 155–164.




FIGURE 1: OVERALL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Fast detection of data-leakage framework to avoid sensitive data exposure and also provide privacy preserving to sensitive data. Lucerne search framework to detect the sensible data easily using indexing technique. Levenshtein distance algorithm to detect the shuffling of transferred mail content. To implement the own logics for detect sampling of transferred mail content appropriately. We implement threshold rate based on assigning and checking domains based user filtering technique. In future it will be created with the deleting of request list if it is checked or proceeded once.

#### REFERENCES

- [1] X. Shu, D. Yao, and E. Bertino, "Privacy preserving detection of sensitive data exposure," *IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security*, vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 1092–1103, May 2015.
- [2] K. Borders and A. Prakash, "Quantifying information leaks in outbound Web traffic," in *Proc. 30th IEEE Symp. Secur. Privacy (SP)*, May 2009, pp. 129–140.
- [3] S. Jha, L. Kruger, and V. Shmatikov, "Towards practical privacy for genomic computation," in *Proc. IEEE Symp. Secur. Privacy*, May 2008, pp. 216–230.